

A Comprehensive Theory of Appeals

From www.wca-refracted.com

© 2014

W. Clifton Adams

Abstract

This paper integrates communication and cognitive theories to develop a unified and comprehensive theory of appeals. Based on Hayakawa's, not Korzybski's, construction of *abstract*, it advances Brockreide and Ehninger's expansion on Toulmin's model, particularly in terms of motivation, to link to contemporary cognitive theories. The linkage shows where triggers for appeals are located in Fishbein and Ajzen's system. Finally it provides examples of appeals, ranging from obvious to more subtle, modeled around the reasoning model.

Key Words: Appeals, Toulmin, Warrants, Cognitions, Behavioral Intention

The concept of motivation resigns across disciplines in the social sciences. Its best fit in communication studies as it is reflected in appeals. Early writings in communication discussed motive appeals as, 'contradistinguishing from the term, 'rational appeals.'"¹ This view persisted even with Brockreide and Ehninger's expansion of Toulmin's model.² Cronkhite modified this expansion to include a *motivational concept* which, in effect, introduced an element of motive into logical appeals.³ This paper continues the expansion while advancing the integration of motive with reasoning. In so doing, it seeks an alignment with such authors as Allport and

A Comprehensive Theory of Appeals

Minnick who identify the breath of emotions impacts beyond emotional appeals.⁴ To accomplish this purpose, it must establish its position on the construct of *abstraction*.

Alfred Korzybski developed the *Semantic Differential* with its *levels of abstraction*. The levels reflect the nature of the distortions in a person's perception of reality. The higher the level, the more separated is the person's thought from the reality on which the thought is supposedly based. In Korzybski's system, then, *abstraction* is a variable to be understood so as to reduce its negative effects.⁵

Korzybski recognized that at each level of his differential, the word, *abstraction*, has a different meaning. He stated on page 179, "The term 'abstracting' is a multiordinal term, and hence has different meanings, depending on the order of abstractions."⁶

Hayakawa was a student of Korzybski and was influenced by him. Still, Hayakawa credited diversity of influence in the development of general semantics.⁷ Thus, Hayakawa in his *abstraction ladders* defined *abstract* more consistently. Hayakawa defined *abstract* in terms of inclusiveness. The more abstract the concept, the more of reality it denotes.⁸

As used in Hayakawa's system, *abstraction* is a positive concept. He said, "The interesting writer, the informative speaker, the accurate thinker, and well-adjusted individual, operate on all levels of the abstraction ladder, moving quickly and gracefully and in orderly fashion from higher to lower, from lower to higher...."⁹

It is Hayakawa's conception of abstraction in the symbolization process that permits an accurate understanding of reasoning. In turn, it is reasoning that unites communication with cognitive theories to provide a coherent theory of appeals.

A Comprehensive Theory of Appeals

Brockreide and Ehninger laid the foundation for this theory of appeals by applying Toulman's model to "rhetorical proofs." In their article, they linked warrants to "rhetoric proofs" mirroring Aristotle's proofs of logos, pathos and ethos (see Figure 1).¹⁰

Figure 1

Linkage of Warrants to Aristotle's Proofs

Substantive -----	Logos
Authoritative -----	Ethos
Motivational -----	Pathos

The present essay advances Brockreide and Ehninger's work by first explicating a post-Aristotelian view of reasoning and placing the Toulmin model within that context. Next, it establishes a definition of an appeal incorporating this view. Third, it positions the triggers for appeals within cognitive systems. Finally, it classifies appeals and diagrams examples. Through all of this development, it seeks an alignment with the view that the breath of emotions impacts beyond motional proofs.¹¹

Toulmin as Deduction

Aristotle's deduction demanded a blanket existential assumption in that it was the application of a categorical verity to an entity included in the category.¹² What was true of the category had to be true of the particular entity to which it was applied. So, deduction was distinguished from induction in two ways: (1) deduction was the reverse process of induction; it was moving from a general principle to a specific conclusion; and, (2) there was no inference involved. Deduction was a process involving absolutes; induction resided in the world of the probable. According to Copi, "Modern logicians

A Comprehensive Theory of Appeals

decline to make blanket existential propositions, even though this means this decision forces them to give up some of Aristotelian logic.”¹³

Indeed, the departure from Aristotle began at least with William Whewell who identified the inferential nature of both phases of reasoning. In “Two Principles Processes by which Science is Constructed,” of his *Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*, written in the 1840’s and 50’s with the three-volume version published in 1857, he stated. “When this step [induction] is once made, it becomes possible to deduct from the truth thus established, a train of consequences often in no small degree long and complex. The process of making these inferences may properly be described by the word Deduction.”¹⁴

In the post-Aristotelian differentiation, induction and deduction are reverse processes. The distinction between them reflects Hayakawa’s concept of abstraction: induction bases its inference on the generalization from specifics to make an abstract principle; deduction bases its inference on the application of the abstract principle to relevant specifics.¹⁵

Brockreide and Ehninger, in general, discussed Toulmin in a way as to reflect a model of deduction. To them, data was specific proof or evidence, claim was equivalent with conclusion and warrant bridged the two. “A claim may stand as the first proposition in an argument or it may be an intermediate statement which serves as data for a subsequent inference ... Its (the warrant’s) function is to carry the accepted data to the doubted or disbelieved proposition which constitutes the claim, thereby certifying the claim as true or accepted”¹⁶

A Comprehensive Theory of Appeals

To Brockreide and Ehninger, then, each of Toulmin's three main parts was distinctive based on its function within the particular argument. They saw data as the specific evidence used to justify the claim and warrant as the rule that connected, logically, the evidence to the conclusion. This understanding was not shared by Eemeren and his colleagues who argued there is no difference in *warrant* and *data*. They based their argument on the fact that Toulmin in explaining arguments placed claims at the beginning of an argument and followed it with data as ground for that claim. They, then, reasoned that whatever statement is used to support the claim has to be data.¹⁷ Brockreide and Ehninger, obviously, did not interpret the order within Toulmin's explanation to be the absolute flow of an argument.¹⁸ Toulmin, himself, stressed the need to distinguish between data and warrant. He recognized that the distinction could not be made solely with grammatical tests and that the "distinction may appear to be far from absolute"; however, he claimed that clear distinctions are possible: "one may remark that warrants are general, certifying the soundness of *all* arguments of the appropriate type, and have accordingly to be established in quite a different way from the facts we produce as data. This distinction, between data and warrants, is similar to the distinction drawn in the law-courts between questions of fact and questions of law...."¹⁹

Clearly, Toulmin's writings can be used to justify the view that a warrant reflects the general rule that bridges evidence and conclusion in deduction. His examples of arguments using claim, data and warrant repeatedly reflected deductive reasoning. Toulmin, writing with Rieke and Janik substituted the word grounds for data and described warrant as "G, therefore C."²⁰ This representation of warrant shows its

A Comprehensive Theory of Appeals

abstract nature the same as in the major premise of post-Aristotelian deduction. The writers then illustrate this abstract nature with examples: such as, W: where there is smoke, there is fire; G: there is smoke, therefore C: there must be fire.²¹

Not only should Toulmin's basic model be view as post-Aristotelian deduction based on his writings, it must be view so based on logic: in order to bridge data with claim, his warrant must encompass both in the same way that a major premise must include the minor premise and the conclusion. Recognizing the abstract nature of a warrant permits a clearer application of Toulmin to appeals than was provided by Brockreide and Ehninger as discussed in the next section.

Appeals as Warrants

Brockreide and Ehninger's application of Toulmin to proofs maintained a division between logical and motivational arguments. In both their substantive and authoritative arguments, the examples followed the pattern of a logical deductive argument. However, in their motivational arguments, the *warrant* provided an emotional means of movement to a *claim*. To them, in the motivational argument, the justification for behavior (*claim*) was provided by the *warrant* which identified the compelling motive. It was the data that linked the behavior to the motive in such a way as to provide the logical link similar to the warrant in their other two types of arguments.²² Cronkhite argued, correctly, that the warrant of Brockreide and Ehninger was inadequate; however, instead of calling for the warrant to make the needed link between motive and behavior, he presented an alternative paradigm in which a "motivational concept" functioned

A Comprehensive Theory of Appeals

parallel with the *warrant* to increase the acceptance of the claim and the corresponding change in behavior.²³

In 1965, Knepprath and Clevenger compared the traditional view of Brockreide and Ehninger's with that of Cronkhite. Knepprath and Clevenger defined the traditional view of emotional proof (data) as one that offered some reward for modified behavior, a definition that associated a motivational element (reward) with a substantive one (behavior).²⁴ They disagreed with this traditional view; however, instead of recognizing that in this view the emotional proof, logically, functioned not as data but as warrant, they contended, "emotional proofs are concerned with the content of a unit of discourse and that logical proof is concerned with its form."²⁵ Still, their contention had some merit since the warrant, the heart of an appeal, establishes the logical form and the data contains the emotional content.

The "reward" in this traditional "proof", was broad enough to include the avoidance of negative consequences. As was clear from the earlier work of Janis and Hovland, the emotional compulsion to change one's behavior can be based on fear as well as on hope.²⁶ In Miller and Hewgill's review of the research on fear appeal, they included studies that associated a harmful effect to some failure to comply.²⁷ Frandsen had used the term "threat appeal" for the same linkage.²⁸ More recent studies have been consistent in defining fear appeals as messages that make a connection, ranging from direct to subtle, of behavior to negative consequence.²⁹

A Comprehensive Theory of Appeals

In the traditional view, then, the evidence or proof in motivational arguments, explicitly or implicitly, spans (1) behavioral change and (2) either a positive or a negative outcome. As viewed from a position that appeals function following a post-Aristotelian deduction model, this proof would convert to the warrant and be identified, for simplification, as the appeal.

The difference in Brockreide and Ehninger's position and one that treats appeals consistent with the post-Aristotelian definition of deduction, is illustrated below with Brockreide and Ehninger example as they drew it (figure 2) in contrast with the alternative (figure 3). The link between motive and behavior is contained in their data; their warrant provides the drive for change, but fails to link that drive to the behavior.²⁰

Figure 2

Brockreide and Ehninger (1960) Example of Motivation Proof





Figure 3

Brockreide and Ehninger (1960) Example as Deduction



Appeals as Triggers in Cognitive Systems

Not only can post-Aristotelian deduction best be viewed in terms of Hayakawa's abstraction ladders, cognitive theorists, most notably Milton Rokeach, arranged beliefs in an ascending order from more general values to more specific attitudes.³¹ This commonality permits the expansion of Brockreide and Ehninger's application of Toulmin to integrate dimensions of meaning with structures of cognition.

The argument above was that appeals include an element of substance. This is part of a main thesis that *pathos* is different than *motivation*. This thesis is advanced by considering three (primary) dimensions of the symbolic process that operate both within the components of speaking and thinking. These three areas correspond closely to the "modern proofs" shown in Figure 1.

The **Reality** dimension: The denotative meanings in this area reference objects and events in the world that exists independent of the individual giving meaning to the symbols. This dimension includes all the broad areas of science, art, history,

A Comprehensive Theory of Appeals

geography, religion, etc. The reality dimension includes all those areas previously discussed within “substantive treatment,” “content dimension,” and “object concept.”³² However, the term *reality* may avoid the suggestion that the other dimensions do not have substance or content. Although these referents are objective, the symbols that represent them do evoke attitudes within individuals; these attitudes contain all three components: cognitive, affective and behavioral.³³ Thus, the symbols evoking the reality dimension do have connotations and do evoke varying degrees of emotions.

The **Social** dimension: The denotative meanings within this dimension reference the relationships of other people to the person assigning meaning to these symbols. This dimension includes associations connected with business, family, fellowship, romance and the like. Stress in this dimension has typically been on its connotative aspects. As such, variables such as power, trust, and attractiveness have been studied. In symbolic form, its meaning is predominately found in the actions of speech.³⁴ This dimension includes all those areas previously covered by “person perception” and “credibility.”³⁵

The **Goal** dimension: The meanings within this dimension are all internal.³⁶ Still, these meanings are both implied and suggested.³⁷ This denotation relate to all aspects of our lives; it is in our hopes, aspirations and dreams. This dimension relates to motives that provide the drives and the emotional empowerment that supply the energy for the potential obtainment of our goals. This dimension is most associated with that previously covered by “motional proofs.”³⁸ Cronkhite’s *motivational concepts* clearly spoke to this dimension.³⁹

A Comprehensive Theory of Appeals

These three dimensions are interactive. A major proportion of empirical research into the nature of attitudes has investigated these interrelationships. Typically, measures within the *reality dimension* served as the dependent variable to gauge the impact of either credibility or motivation.⁴⁰ McGuire, with his “wishful thinking” illustrated the impact of goals on logic as related to the reality dimension.⁴¹ Cronkhite associated goals with reality in overlaying his *motivational concept* on Toulmin’s system.⁴² Most relevant, perhaps, are the studies establishing the *congruity principle*.⁴³ The essence of the congruity formula probably accounts for the resolution of messages containing perceived inconsistencies between and among these three dimensions. Our cognitive world could then be represented as a *pyramid of predominant meaning*, as shown in Figure 4, defined by these three dimensions with any imbalance being resolved by shifts in meaning within the pyramid.⁴⁴

While individuals process messages by using all three dimensions in an interactive way, Toulmin’s system can be helpful in understanding this process. Such, certainly, was suggested by Ajzen and Fishbein naming their analysis, “a theory of reasoned action.”⁴⁵

Link to Fishbein and Ajzen


Given the above recasting of appeals, Toulmin’s model can be more clearly applied to current cognitive theory.⁴⁶ Fundamental to this application is the recognition that the symbolic process is similar both in thought and in the speech act.⁴⁷ This correspondence was identified by Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* even as it relates to *pathos*.⁴⁸ It is also reflected in Rokeach’s extensive empirical analysis.⁴⁹ In his system, cognitions are built from most abstract values to specific attitudes, resembling the nature of

A Comprehensive Theory of Appeals

Hayakawa’s abstraction ladder.⁵⁰ Based on their general to specific hierarchy, belief systems would most likely reflect characteristics of deductive reasoning in their formation from values to attitudes.

Figure 4

Pyramids of Predominant Meaning



Certainly within the attitude area, a preponderance of empirical support from cognitive-balance theories illustrated the human need for consistency.⁵¹ Although the means of maintaining consistency may contain distortions, people believe themselves to be reasonable.⁵² The individual’s reasoning process, even with the distortions, should be amenable to analysis using Toulmin’s model.⁵³

Within attitudes, Fishbein and Ajzen added the variable of *behavioral intentions*. *Behavioral intentions* trigger behavior, given the correct stimuli.⁵⁴ Fishbein and Ajzen


A Comprehensive Theory of Appeals

also include a consideration of *norms* within their calculations.⁵⁵ Attitudes, containing affect components are, then, the bases for *behavioral intentions*. The affect component in Fishbein and Ajzen's model recognizes an element of emotion within cognitions.⁵⁶ However, to more clearly reflect the impact of emotion, the model needs to be expanded in two ways.

The first addition would reflect three dimensions of meaning (see Figure 5). The three dimensions contribute to intention. The *affect* component would be the strongest component in both *social* and *goal* dimensions. Plus, the *goal* component would contain the motives that justify the *behavioral intentions*. Thus, this area releases the emotional energy needed both to make the resolution to act and to act at the appropriate time. So, this addition adds considerably to the emotional source from which the proof of *pathos* receives its power.

Figure 5
Additions to Fishbein and Ajzen


Cognitive Dimensions



The second addition would expand on Fishbein and Ajzen's recognition of the role of norms in affecting behavior⁵⁷. Action, particularly that involving change, requires energy to overcome resistance to act and to change.⁵⁸ A major proportion of the resistance comes from norms within our social attitudes.⁵⁹ In addition, the resistance comes from other factors often associated with persuasibility.⁶⁰ These factors encapsulate our intentions to act; thus, they are termed *encapsulators* (see Figure 6).⁶¹

Figure 6

Encapsulators of Behavioral Intent



Link to Petty and Cacioppo

The modifications and expansions of cognitive theory by Petty and Cacioppo most probably have implications for the resolution of confusion within the *pyramid of predominant meaning*.⁶² Resolution in the peripheral route should favor the social and goal dimensions. Research involving relevant variables in this context show impacts of amount and complexity of information on processing of messages; the complexity component speaks, in part, to the affect dimension of information.⁶³ A suggestion from this research is, "It would be useful to examine how complexity and consistency of knowledge interact with the number of goals of behavior."⁶⁴ One series of investigations suggest that the functioning of encapsulators would differ depending on the informational route.⁶⁵ Overall, it is reasonable to conclude that Toulmin's model would have utility in advancing our understanding of how individuals process appeals.

Application of Toulmin


In Toulmin's terms *behavioral intentions* are best seen as warrants. They embed appeals that have been accepted. The person has accepted a means of satisfying a particular desire and is simply waiting for the appropriate opportunity to act. Within the context of a network of attitudes that are built from general to specific, *the behavioral*

A Comprehensive Theory of Appeals

intentions are the most specific within any series of *warrants/beliefs*. The surrounding *encapsulators* then serve as *reservations* (see Figure 7). The application of the proof of *pathos*, thus, involves both the appropriate use of appeals to heighten listeners desire to act under the correct circumstances and well tailored communication that will enable the person to act regardless of norms and personal inhibitions to the contrary.⁶⁶

Figure 7

Encapsulators within the Toulmin System



(RSG = weighted attitudes within the Reality, Social and Goal dimensions of cognitions. BI = Behavioral Intention. Similar to Cronkhite (1969), this network would extent outward to the left and downward as arguments are chained in *backing*. The bottom RSG is larger to indicate a higher level of abstraction)

A Comprehensive Theory of Appeals

Defining an appeal as a prediction linking motive to behavior distinguishes it from a promise or a threat. “Promise” and “threat” are statements made by a person who has some ability and intent to ensure that the specified consequences do or do not occur. Threats and promises are legitimately made by parents, teachers, coaches, police officers and the like. Still, they fall outside the scope of the appeals process.⁶⁷

Admittedly, an effective persuader may use appeals so effectively that the listeners will feel they have no choice but to comply. However, the speaker stops being a persuader and becomes a parent, boss or whatever if the listeners believe that it is the speaker who will ensure that the behavior results in the reward or punishment. A coach could say, “Practice your free throws and you’ll win the game for us and be our star,” and be a persuader because the consequences are beyond the coach’s power. However, he is in the role of coach only if he says, “Either you practice your free throws or you won’t start in the big game.”

Types of Appeals

Fear appeals versus positive appeals constitute the most significant typing. Once this category of the appeal is identified, perhaps the most useful way to classify an appeal is by the motive that it taps. Types of appeals provide variety in means to reach members of an audience. A simple, yet comprehensive system is Phillip’s Seven Impelling Motives.⁶⁸ See Table 1 one for examples from this system.

The examples in Table 1 are in the form of a prediction for the sake of clarity. It is the most obvious form for an appeal. A close second is the format of a suggestion, “If you want to feel better about yourself, you could exercise.” Suggestions make the prediction less obvious and, thus, the appeal less direct. To that degree, a suggestion may be

A Comprehensive Theory of Appeals

viewed as more subtle.

Table 1
Examples of Appeals Using Appeals to Different Motives

Type Motive	Example
Life preservation	If you exercise regularly, you'll live longer
Property:	If you exercise regularly, you'll work more productively And gain in your purchases.
Power:	If you exercise regularly, others will also.
Property	If you exercise regularly, you will be more productive thus increasing your purchasing power.
Affection	If you exercise regularly, your significant other will love you for it.
Reputation	If you exercise regularly, others will talk about how fit you've become.
Sentiment	If you exercise regularly, you'll feel good about yourself.
Taste	If you exercise regularly, you'll enjoy life more.

With subtle appeals, it may be difficult to determine the characteristic of the relationship between behavior and consequences implied in the appeal. However, when the relationship is clear or can be sufficiently inferred, the nature of the link made in the

A Comprehensive Theory of Appeals

relationship provides a third way of typing the appeal. Five such links are apparent; Table 2 summarizes these five.⁶⁹ The examples in the following discussion of these five links continue to use the more obvious statements on the topic of exercise so that the emphasis can be on variety in the form.

Table 2
Summary of Types of Appeals based on
Characteristic of Relationship

Type Appeal	Symbolic Form	Alternative Terminology
Cause	y if and only if x	Causal/cause and effect
Contingency	y then x or x then y	sign/conditional
Division	y can only be a, b, c or d	disjunctive
Classification	y_i has c	genus/generalization
Similarity	y and x are alike	analogy/parallel case

Forms of the Expression of an Appeal

1. A cause link⁷⁰

“If you exercise regularly, you’ll live longer,” is in a less obvious form of a cause warrant. It is functional equivalent statement to “Regular exercise causes you to live longer.” If the statement is expressed in this more obvious “cause” format, it may be viewed as a statement of fact and the listener may not recognize its intent. Figure 8 diagrams this argument.

2. A contingency link⁷¹


“If you exercise regularly, you’ll probably be happier,” is an example of a prediction based on a contingency. A fair interpretation of this prediction in “factual” format is,

A Comprehensive Theory of Appeals


“Exercising and happiness tend to occur in the same people.” The two things tend to go together but one isn’t presented as a cause of the other. Figure 9 diagrams this appeal.

Figure 8

Example of an Appeal as a Cause Warrant

**Figure 9**

Example of an Appeal as a Contingency Warrant



3. A Division Link⁷²

In its simplest form, the division link provides an either-or choice. “You can either exercise or be unpopular,” is an example of a division link stated as a fact. As a prediction the appeal reverts to a cause link. When a division appeal offers more than the either-or options, its complexity demands a chained appeal with another type warrant. . Figure 10 shows an either-or appeal; Figure 11 is an example of the division link with more options that in turn uses a cause appeal.

Figure 10

Example of an Appeal as an Either-Or Division Warrant





Figure 11

Example of a Multi-Option Division Argument




4. A classification link⁷³

“People who want more out of life have found that exercise is the key,” is an example of a classification. It is a little more subtle than the appeals based on the previous links because the listeners must place themselves in the group of people who want more out of life. It has more of a factual nature. Figure12 illustrates the logic of this classification appeal.

Figure 12

Example of a Classification Appeal




5. A similarity link⁷⁴

As a similarity warrant, the appeal could take various forms, many would be very subtle, such as, "Exercise is like a money chest." A more direct similarity link would be, "Athletic individuals similar to you have found exercise a profitable endeavor. This link is probably reflects reality more clearly. If the listeners do see themselves as athletic, they would likely accept the statement as being logical. Figure 13 shows the more direct example of a similarity appeal.

Figure 13

Example of a Similarity Appeal



Implied Links

Obviously, appeals are often more subtle than the examples presented above. The examples in this section diagram three ways that appeals often are arranged in speeches where they are likely to be more subtle and usually only implied.

1. In the Backing for the Warrant⁷⁵


The main points developed in most speeches are conclusions that the speaker wants the audience to accept based on the supporting material presented in the speech. However, the supporting materials and the main points may help establish a warrant in the minds of the listeners. For example, in a speech about a new exercise machine, the points might be: “The machine take up little space,” “The machine is well constructed,” and “The machine is easy to use.” These points could be an informative speech for an uninformed, passive audience. However, for a partisan, concerted audience the speech could suggest the link, “This machine would make a nice possession for someone who is

A Comprehensive Theory of Appeals

into exercise.” For that audience, the speech represents backing for the warrant; the speech implies an appeal (see Figure 14).

Figure 14

Example of a Speech Serving as Backing for an Appeal




2. In the Backing for the Data⁷⁶

The speech may be stimulating, reflective or plain spoken. It may be in situations such as a pep rally. It may be after a tragedy or a disappointment. It may be when the group has lost a sense of purpose. Usually, the group is homogeneous. In each case, the speech stresses goals and intents. The speech probably reviews the history of the group and what brought them to the moment. It probably speaks of people rising to the occasion. It probably addresses a sense of urgency and a faith in the group. The speech seeks to heighten the group’s awareness of what they want as a group. The speech serves as backing for the data (see Figure 15).

Figure 15

Example of a Speech Serving as Backing for a Motive




3. In Describing a Course of Action⁷⁷

In speaking to an organized audience, the speaker knows that the listeners want to be involved and it is speaker's task to provide clear and adequate instructions to get the job completed successfully. No motivation is, theoretically, needed. However, the speaker may help the audience visualize the completion of the task in such a way as to heighten their motivation. Similarly for a concerted audience and some uninformed and, even, unconcerned neutral audiences, the speaker may focus on the outcome as if the audience is motivated to follow the instructions provided. Often, this technique is labeled, "implied consent," since in informing the audience of what needs to be done, the appeal is implied (see Figure 16).

Figure 16

Example of a Speech Implying consent



Discussion

This paper uses reasoning concepts to advance the work of Brockreide and Ehninger⁷⁸ particularly in terms of *pathos*. In so doing, it bridges their fundamental work in communication with traditional cognitive theory reflected in the works of Rokeach, of Fishbein and Ajzen, and of Petty and Cacioppo.⁷⁹ The reasoning concepts used for this bridge came from Toulmin.⁸⁰ The resulting model, then, provides a comprehensive view that illustrates the processing of meaning, cognitively, within its three dimensions to establish an intention to act.

By identifying Hayakawa's *abstraction* as a commonality, the present paper has associated the formulations resulting from major research efforts.⁸¹ To the extent that the identification of the commonality is correct, each separate formulation is strengthened by the research of the others. Still, the resulting understanding invites inquiry anew. One clear expectation is that new explorations will be initiated into the cognitive nature of emotions. Probably, the presupposition which most invites further research is that the three dimensions of meaning are interactive. Additionally, the

A Comprehensive Theory of Appeals

typing of appeals, particularly the different linkages, suggests areas for analysis. It would seem that the different linkages vary in terms of their probably validity and power to persuade. As with Richard M. Weaver's system, different speaker could favor one type argument more than the others.⁸² To the extent that the insights here serve to increase the understanding of communication, they should also advance research.

Notes

- [1] G. Roland Collins, "The relative Effectiveness of the Condensed and Extended Motive Appeals." *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 10 (1924): 221-230, p. 222.
- [2] Wayne Brockriede and Douglas Ehninger, "Toulmin on argument," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 46 (1960): 44-58.
- [3] Gary Cronkhite, *Persuasion: Speech and Behavioral Change* (Indianapolis: Bobs Merrill, 1969).
- [4] Gregory Allport, *Pattern and Growth in Personality* (New York: Holt: Rinehart & Winston 1961); Wayne C. Minnick, *The Art of Persuasion* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1961).
- [5] Alfred Korzybski, *Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics* (Fort Worth, TX: The Institution of General Semantics, 1958).
- [6] Korzybski, 179.
- [7] Samuel I. Hayakawa. "Forward," in Samuel I. Hayakawa (Ed.), *Language, meaning and Maturity: A Review of General Semantics 1943-53* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954) vi-xii.

A Comprehensive Theory of Appeals

- [8] Samuel I. Hayakawa, *Language in Thought and Action* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1949).
- [9] Hayakawa, *Language*, 180.
- [10] Wayne Brockriede and Douglas Ehninger; Stephen E. Toulmin, *The Uses of Argument* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge U Press, 1958); Lane Cooper, Trans. *The Rhetoric of Aristotle* (London: Prentice-Hall, 1932).
- [11] In general, this view is best reflected Allport, Minnick.
- [12] Irving, M. Copi, *Introduction to Logic, 6th ed.* (New York: McMillian , 1982), 199-201.
- [13] Copi, 201.
- [14] William Whewell, "Two Principles Processes by which Science is Constructed," In *Selected Writings of the History of Science*, ed. Yehuda Elkana (Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 1984), 317-318.
- [15] Hayakawa, *Language in Thought and Action*.
- [16] Brockriede and Ehninger, 45. Typical of traditional debate texts, Brockriede and Ehninger placed emphasis on evidence and defined the argumentation process as beginning with evidence. In addition to Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede, *Decision by Debate*, 2nd. (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 42, see George W. Ziegelmüller, and Charles A. Dause, *Argumentation: Inquiry and Advocacy*. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Printice Hall, 1975), 86. Indeed, Ziegelmüller and Dause, 88-92, went so far as to fault the traditional definition of *induction* and *deduction* for not being consistent with their view.

A Comprehensive Theory of Appeals

- [17] Frantz van Eemeren, Rob Grootendorst, Francisca Snoeck Henkermans, J. Anthony Blair, Ralph H. Johnson, Erik C. W. Krabbe, Christian Plantin, Douglas N. Walton, Charles A. Willard, John Woods, David Zarefsky, *Fundamentals of Argumentation of Theory: A Handbook of Historical Backgrounds and Contemporary Developments*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 158-159.
- [18] Brockriede and Ehninger. Others have argued directly for a distinction between data and warrant; see, David Hitchcock, "Toulmin's Warrants," In Frantz H. van Eemeren, J. A. Blair, C.A. Williard & A. F. S. Henekemans (Eds.), *Anyone Who Has a View: Theoretical Contributions to the Study of Argumentation* (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic, 2003), 69-82.
- [19]. Toulmin 99,100.
- [20] Stephen E. Toulmin, Richard Rieke, and Allan Janik, *An Introduction to Reasoning* (New York: Macmillan, 1979), 44.
- [21] Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik, 46-53.
- [22] Brockriede and Ehninger.
- [23] Gary Cronkhite.
- [24] Eugene Knepprath, and Theodore Clevenger, Jr., "Reasoned Discourse and Motive Appeals in Selected Political Speeches," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 51, (1965): 152-157.
- [25] Knepprath and Clevenger, 154.
- [26] Irving L. Janis and Carl I. Hovland "An Overview of Persuasibility Research. In *Yale Studies in Attitude and Communication* Vol. 2, eds. Carl I. Hovland & Irving L. Janis (New Haven:Yale U Press,1959), pp. 1-28.

A Comprehensive Theory of Appeals

- [27] Gerald R. Miller and Murray A. Hewgill, "Some Recent Research on Fear-Arousing Message Appeals," *Speech Monographs*, 33, (1966): 377-391.
- [28] Kenneth Frandsen, "Effects of Threat Appeals and Media of Transmission," *Speech Monographs*, 30, (1963): 101-104.
- [29] See, for example James A Katt and Steven J. Condly, "A Preliminary Study of Classroom Motivators and De-motivators from a Motivational-hygiene Perspective. *Communication Education*, 58, (2009) 189-212; David Roskos-Ewoldsen, H. Jessey Yu, & Nancy Rhodes, "Fear Appeal Messages Affect Accessibility of Attitudes toward the Threat and Adaptive Behavior. *Communication Monographs*, 71, (2004), 49-69; Rose Sprinkle, Steven Hunt, Cheri Simonds, and Mark Comadena, "Fear in the Classroom: An Examination of Teachers' Use of Fear Appeals and Students' Learning Outcomes. *Communication Education*, 55, (2006), 389-402; and, Norman H. C. Wong, and Joseph N.Cappella, "Antismoking Treat and Efficacy Appeals: Effects on Smoking Cessation Intentions for Smokers with Low and High Readiness to Quit. *Journal of Applied Communication Research*, 37, (2009), 1-20.
- [30] Brockriede and Ehninger.
- [31] Milton Rokeach, *The Open and Closed Mind, Investigations into the Nature of Belief Systems, and Personality* (New York: Basic Books: 1960); Milton Rokeach, *The Nature of Human Values* (New York: The Free Press: 1973); Milton Rokeach, *Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers: 1986). .

A Comprehensive Theory of Appeals

- [32] Brockriede and Ehninger; Paul Watzlawick, Janet H. Beavin, and Don D. Jackson, *Pragmatics of Human Communication* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton Company: 1967); Cronkhite; Charles E. Osgood, George Suci, and Percy H. Tannenbaum, *The Measurement of Meaning: A Study of Interactional Patterns and Paradoxes* (Urbana: U. of Ill. Press, 1957).
- [33] Martin Fishbein, "Attitude and the Prediction of Behavior," *In Readings in Attitude Theory & Measurement*, Ed. Martin Fishbein (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957), 477-492..
- [34] Gregory Bateson. *Steps to an Ecology of Mind* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1973); Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson; Paul Ekman and W. V. Friesen, *Unmasking the Face* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1975); A Mehrabian, (1981). *Silent Messages: Implicit Communication of Emotions and Attitudes* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1981).
- [35] Since Aristotle, scholars have been dissecting how others are perceived. Sarah Trenholm, *Persuasion and Social Influence* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989), 62-92, 179-201 did an excellent job both of summarizing these components and amending them.
- [36] Goals have been identified as a key component of communication since, at least Fritz Heider, *The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations* (New York: Wiley, 1958). Both *adjustment* and *value expression* function of attitudes speak to this dimension in Daniel Katz, "The Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 24 (1960): 163-204.

A Comprehensive Theory of Appeals

- [37] See, for example, Heider; Henk Aarts, Peter M. Gollwitzer and Ran R. Assin, "Goal Contagion: Perceiving Is for Pursuing," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 87 (1) (2004): 23-37.
- [38] Brockriede and Ehninger
- [38] Cronkhite.
- [40] See Kenneth E. Anderson and Theodore Clevenger, Jr., "A summary of experimental research in ethos," *Speech Monographs*, 30 (1963): 59-78; James C. McCroskey, "A Summary of Experimental Research in Effects of Evidence in Persuasive Communication," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 55 (1969): 169-176; Chanthika Pornipitakpan, *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 34 (2002): 243-281; Joohn C. Reinard, "The Empirical Study of the Persuasive Effects of Evidence: The Status after Fifty Years of Research," *Human Communication Research*, 15 (1988): 3-59.
- [41] William J. McGuire, ".A Syllogistic Analysis of Cognitive Relationships," in *Attitude Organization and Change*, eds. Milton J. Rosenberg et al. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), 65-111.
- [42] Cronkhite.
- [43] Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum.
- [44] W. Clifton Adams and E. Sam Cox, "Two Views on Motivational Appeals: Which Should Be Viewed as Unconventional?" www.wca-refracted.com. The pyramid is an extension of the congruity models of Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum given that the dimensions of meaning are orthogonal.

A Comprehensive Theory of Appeals

- [45] Icek Ajzen and Martin Fishbein, *Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social Behavior* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980), 1.
- [46] Toulmin; Toulmin, Rieke, & Janik.
- [47] The term, "speech act," is use here in its more generic sense, as with Bateson, only to recognize the various elements that are in voiced expressions, not to reference any specific construction such as John L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) or John R. Searle, *Speech Acts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- [48] For example, the theses in the *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, ed. A. O. Rorty (Berkeley: U of California Press) all speak to the cognitive dimensions of pathos.
- [49] Rokeach, *The Open and Closed Mind*; Rokeach, Rokeach, *The Nature of Human Values*; Rokeach, *Beliefs, Attitudes and Values*.
- [50] Hayakawa, *Language in Thought and Action*.
- [51] (see for example Heider; Osgood, Suci and Tanenbaum; and Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson, 1957).
- [52] This is one axiom of balance theories.
- [53] Toulmin; Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik.
- [54] Fishbein; Fishbein and Ajzen; Ajzen and Fishbein.
- [55] Fishbein and Ajzen, 301-307.
- [56] Fishbein and Ajzen.
- [57] Fishbein and Ajzen.
- [58] Allport.
- [59] See Solomon Asch.

A Comprehensive Theory of Appeals

- [60] (See Janis & Hovland, 1959 and Trenholm, 1989).
- [61] 'Adams and Cox.' www.wca-refracted.com. These *encapsulators* sometimes facilitate action, but more often they inhibit it.
- [62] Richard E. Petty and John T. Cacioppo, *Communication and Persuasion: Central and Peripheral Routs to Attitude Change* (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1956).
- [63] Leandre R. Fabrigar, Richard E. Petty, Steven M. Smith and Stephen L. Crites, Jr., "Understanding Knowledge Effects on Attitude in Behaviour Consistency: The Role of Relevance, Complexity and Amount of Knowledge, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 90 (4)(2006), 556-577.
- [64] Fabrigar et at., 575.
- [65] See Bobi Ivanov, Michael Pfau and Kimberly Ann Parker, "The Attitude Base as a Moderator of the Effectiveness of Inoculation Strategy," *Communication Monographs*, 76 (2009), 47-72; Michael Pfau, Shane M. Semmler, Leslie Deatrack, Alicia Mason, Gewn Nisbet, Lindsay Lane, Elizabeth Craig, Jill Underhill and John Banas, "Nuances about the Role and Impact of Affect in Inoculation," *Communication Monographs*, 76 (2009), 73-98.
- [66] 'Adams and Cox.' www.wca-refracted.com. These conclusions are derived from the nature of behavioral intentions and the workings of the Toulmin model.
- [67] These distinctions are consistent with those made by social psychologists, see James T. Tedeschi, Barry R. Schlenker, and Svenn Lindskold, "Influence, Decision, and Compliance," in *The Social Influence Process* ed. James T. Tedeschi (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton 1972).

A Comprehensive Theory of Appeals

- [68] Arthur E. Philips, *Effective Speaking* (Chicago: The Newton Company, (1908), 48-72. Also reprinted in W. N. Thompson (1975). *The Process of Persuasion: Principles and Readings*. (NY: Harper & Row, 1975), 246-250. [65] Harry L. Hollingsworth, *The Psychology of Audiences* (New York: American Book Co., 1935).
- [69] This system mirrors Douglas Ehninger, *Influence, Belief, and Argument: An Introduction to Responsible Persuasion* (Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman, 1974), 67-88. His focus was on relating data to claim as opposed to categorizing the nature of the relationship identified in the link; thus, he had five techniques to make the connection. One of the techniques defined the induction process. So, not to exceed the major number of five, he combined two techniques into one class.
- [70] Ehninger, 76-79, termed the use of this type warrant as a *causal link* as a subcategory of the *technique of connection*.
- [71] Ehninger, 79-81 named the application of this type warrant a *sign link* and reduced it to a subcategory of *technique of connection*.
- [72] Ehninger, 75-76, discussed the use of this type warrant as the *technique of division*.
- [73] Ehninger, 73-75, Technique of classification. Ehninger, 71-73, also had technique of generalization, a term often used for classification type arguments, which covered the induction process.
- [74] Ehninger, 67-70 termed terms the use of this type warrant, *technique of comparison*.

A Comprehensive Theory of Appeals

- [75] This pattern is typical not only in educational settings but in politics as well. As part of the *argumentative frames* found in speeches of populist speakers is the expectation that the partisan audiences would legitimize the collective fantasy. See, Michael J. Lee, "The Populist Chameleon: The People's Party, Huey Long, George Wallace, and the Populist Argumentative Frame," *The Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 92 (2006): 355-378.
- [76] While this model is most easily associated with pep rallies and half-time speeches, James Jasinski, "Constituting Antebellum African American Identity: Resistance, Violence and Masculinity in Henry Highland Garnet's (1843) 'Address to the Slaves'," *The Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 93 (2007): 27-56, discusses a typical political speech associated with this pattern.
- [77] This pattern is most commonly found in the sales process; however, the use of teen narratives to model resistance to substance abuse would reflect the model: see, Michael L. Hecht and Michelle Miller-Day, "The Drug Resistance Strategies Project as Translational Research," *Journal of Applied Communication Research*, 35 (2007): 343-349.
- [78] Brockreide and Ehninger
- [79] Rokeach (1960, 1973 and 1986), in Fishbein and Ajzen (Fishbein, 1967; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; and Ajzen and Fishbein 1980) and in Petty and Cacioppo.
- [80] Toulmin; Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik.
- [81] Hayakawa, *Language in Thought and Action*.
- [82] Richard M. Weaver, *The Ethics of Rhetoric*, (Chicago, IL: Henry Regnery Co., 1953), 15-6; James J. Floyd and W. Clifton Adams, "A Content-Analysis Test of

A Comprehensive Theory of Appeals

Richard M. Weaver's Critical Methodology," *The Southern Speech
Communication Journal*, 41 (1976): 374-387.